

Fundsmith Equity Fund

Short Form Report

For the six months ended 30 June 2023 (unaudited)





Profile of the Fund

Investment objective and policy

The investment objective of the Fundsmith Equity Fund (the "Fund") is to achieve long-term growth (over 5 years) in value.

The Fund will invest in equities on a global basis. The Fund's approach is to be a long-term investor in its chosen stocks. It will not adopt short-term trading strategies.

The Fund has stringent investment criteria which the Authorised Corporate Director (ACD) and the appointed investment manager adhere to in selecting securities for the Fund's investment portfolio. These criteria aim to ensure that the Fund invests in businesses:

- that can sustain a high return on operating capital employed;
- whose advantages are difficult to replicate;
- which do not require significant leverage to generate returns:
- with a high degree of certainty of growth from reinvestment of their cash flows at high rates of return;
- that are resilient to change, particularly technological innovation; and
- whose valuation is considered by the Fund to be attractive.

Risk profile

The Fund has no exposure to derivatives and no borrowings. Further, the investments are all in large publicly quoted companies where there is significant liquidity in the stock. The principal risk factor is the market price of the securities held by the Fund which is kept under review in the light of the Fund's objective.


Currency risk: The Fund's portfolio is a global share portfolio and many of the investments are not denominated in sterling. There is no currency hedging in place and the price of shares in the Fund may therefore rise or fall purely on account of exchange rate movements.

Concentration risk: The investment criteria adopted by the Fund significantly limits the number of potential investments. The Fund generally holds 20 to 30 stocks and so it is more concentrated than many other funds. This means that the performance of a single stock within the portfolio has a greater effect on the price of the shares of the Fund.

Operational risk: Failures or delays in operational processes may negatively affect the Fund. There is a risk that any company responsible for the safekeeping of the assets of the Fund may fail to do so properly or may become insolvent, which could cause loss to the Fund.

Risk warning

Any stock market investment involves risk. These risk factors are contained in the full Prospectus. Investors should be aware that the price of shares and the income from them can fall as well as rise and investors may not receive back the full amount invested. Past performance is not a guide to future performance.




The risk category reflects the significance of the Fund's share price fluctuations based on historical data. Historical data may not be a reliable indication of the future risk profile of the Fund. The risk category of the Fund is not guaranteed and may change over time. Further, the lowest category of risk does not mean risk free.

Generally, the higher the risk category, the greater the potential for higher returns but also the higher the risk of losing money. This fund is ranked at 6 because funds of this type have experienced medium to high rises and falls in value in the past. The underlying investments are, however, in large companies with shares that are, in most cases, highly liquid.


There are a number of other risks that are not covered by the indicator above. A full description is contained in the prospectus under the heading "Risk Factors". The most material are currency risk, concentration risk and operational risk which are explained above.

Information on the Fund

Breakdown by geography* as at 30 June 2023



Breakdown by sector as at 30 June 2023



The figures in brackets show comparative figures at 31 December 2022 restated to reflect current sector allocations.

Summary of Significant Changes

For the six months to 30 June 2023		For the six months to 30 June 2022	
Largest purchases	Cost (£)	Largest purchases	Cost (£)
Procter & Gamble	497,938,082	Adobe	700,982,358
Unilever	260,406,885	Mettler-Toledo International	497,369,849
Apple	96,180,025	Alphabet	74,855,914
Church & Dwight	90,161,117	Stryker	36,884,992
Visa	25,131,509	LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton	20,165,476
Total	969,817,618	Total	1,330,258,589
Total purchases for the six months	1,051,664,712	Total purchases for the six months	1,387,881,267
Largest sales	Proceeds (£)	Largest sales	Proceeds (£)
Adobe	551,281,458	Johnson & Johnson	621,464,087
Amazon	525,254,260	Starbucks	480,020,361
Church & Dwight	198,223,741	Unilever	282,648,721
IDEXX Laboratories	186,005,801	Intuit	178,784,880
Estée Lauder	55,079,981	PepsiCo	162,702,563
Total	1,515,845,241	Total	1,725,620,612
Total sales for the six months	1,590,394,842	Total sales for the six months	2,035,696,601

^{*} Breakdown by geography is by country listing and not reflective of breakdown by operations.

Investment Manager's review

July 2023

Dear Fellow Investor,

The table below shows the performance of the Fundsmith Equity Fund ('Fund') and other comparators during the first half of 2023 and since inception.

% Total Return	1st Jan to 30th June 2023	Inception to 30th June 2023	
		Cumulative Annualise	
Fundsmith Equity Fund ¹	+8.5	+527.1	+15.6
Equities ²	+8.9	+288.5	+11.3
UK Bonds ³	-3.4	+15.7	+1.2
Cash ⁴	+2.0	+10.0	+0.8

The Fund is not managed with reference to any benchmark, the above comparators are provided for information purposes only.

Our Fund was up by 8.5% in the first six months of the year, marginally less than what is perhaps the most obvious comparator — the MSCI World Index (£ net).

What did well for us in the first six months of 2023? Here are the five biggest positive contributors to performance:

Stock	Attribution
Meta Platforms	+3.1%
Microsoft	+2.6%
L'Oréal	+1.5%
LVMH	+1.1%
Amadeus	+1.0%

Source: State Street.

At this stage last year Meta was one of our largest detractors and we wrote, 'Meta's stock now trades on a FCF yield of 8.7%. At this level it is either cheap or a so-called value trap.

We will let you know which when we find out, but we are inclined to believe it is the former.' We have now had at least a partial answer to that question, with the stock up 70% over the past year, although we are too paranoid to ever declare victory. What might this illustrate? Clearly that Meta's share price performance has been volatile, and here's the important point, it is much more volatile than its fundamental performance, which should be our primary focus. Plus, we all need to try to ignore the cacophony of noise from commentators which can be useless, or worse where they have an axe to grind.

Microsoft continued to perform well despite revenue growth slowing.

L'Oréal continues to impress with its execution, particularly in China and online, which are inextricably linked. This is in sharp contrast to Estée Lauder, of which more later. LVMH is similarly impressive.

 $^{{}^{\}scriptsize{1}}\textsc{T}$ Class Accumulation shares, net of fees priced at midday UK time, source: Bloomberg.

 $^{^2}$ MSCI World Index, £ Net, priced at close of business US time, source: www.msci.com.

³ Bloomberg/Barclays Bond Indices UK Govt 5-10 year, source: Bloomberg.

⁴ £ Interest Rate, source: Bloomberg.

Investment Manager's review (continued)

Amadeus is staging a recovery from the pandemic along with travel and has almost certainly strengthened its market position during the crisis which we applaud.

The five biggest detractors from our Fund's performance during the period were:

Stock	Attribution
Waters	-1.2%
Estée Lauder	-1.2%
ADP	-0.6%
Mettler-Toledo	-0.4%
Philip Morris	-0.4%

Source: State Street.

Waters and Mettler-Toledo have both been affected by the slowdown in laboratory expenditures post the pandemic. In neither case are we bothered by this. In fact, we hope it presents an opportunity for us to buy more.

Estée Lauder is the only one of the five which concerns us. It fell in response to poor figures occasioned by a build-up, and subsequent write-off, of stock accumulated in anticipation of a reopening of travel by the Chinese after the lockdown. Whilst domestic travel has returned, it seems that Chinese consumers are buying watches, handbags, and other luxury goods first which it was harder to shop for online during the lockdown. It has revealed some severe weakness in Estée Lauder's supply chain with no manufacturing capability in Asia.

We hold Estée Lauder as a complementary cosmetics company to L'Oréal, with strength in America, prestige and traditional distribution channels in contrast to L'Oréal's strengths in China, mass market and online. We await to see how the recent debacle is handled.

ADP has been affected by macroeconomic concerns about the labour market after a strong 2022.

Philip Morris had a sharp share price reaction to one quarter of flat figures which were not only almost certainly a blip but which management had also signalled in advance. I am not sure how this fits with the efficient market hypothesis.

On valuation, the free cash flow ('FCF') yield on the portfolio, which had ended 2022 at 3.2%, fell to about 2.8% at the end of June 2023 through a combination of the rise in share prices and continuing disruption in the conversion of profits into cash and consequent lack of free cash flow growth. It is impossible to be definitive with half year numbers, given seasonality and the fact that it is a short period, but our portfolio is more expensive than the S&P 500 Index on this measure although the S&P contains some extreme numbers such as major oil companies and some healthcare providers apparently on FCF yields of 20% or more.

Our portfolio turnover in the first half was 6.2%. Voluntary dealing (dealing not caused by redemptions or subscriptions) cost £1,192,657 during the half year (0.005% or a 0.5 of a basis point). The Ongoing Charges Figure for the T Class Accumulation shares was 1.04% and with the cost of all dealing added, the Total Cost of Investment was 1.06%.

The most noteworthy item of turnover was probably our sale of Amazon which we had begun purchasing only in July 2021. The immediate cause of the sale was our concern over potential capital misallocation. Relatively new CEO Andy Jassy enunciated some principles of investment which investment projects had to have, namely:

- 1. Be big and capable of delivering good returns on capital.
- Serve an area of the market in which consumers are not already well served.
- Amazon had to have a differentiated approach to competitors'
- Amazon had to have or be able to acquire the competence to execute.

Our view was that there was a lot to like about that statement, and it gave us some comfort in purchasing a stock we had shied away from before. However, it is always easier to talk the talk than it is to walk the walk and the CEO's pronouncement that he wanted Amazon to seek routes to get bigger in grocery retail ran counter to all these principles. In our view grocery retail has none of these characteristics and Amazon has already stubbed its toe in this sector with the Whole Foods acquisition.

Investment Manager's review (continued)

Moreover, our recent experience of engagement with companies which we believe are making capital allocation and other mistakes has produced a much longer list of those who have ignored us than of those who have listened and so we are likely to be more active in exiting such situations where we disagree with the manner in which our investors' capital is being allocated. Where companies choose to invest outside a powerful core franchise in which they already have expertise we believe they are likely to destroy value, and especially so where they are entering a sector which already has poor returns.

A similar thought process led us to exit Adobe.

Whilst I suspect that the Fund price performance is and will remain the primary focus of our investors, we try to remain focused on what is happening with the fundamental performance of these businesses.

At this time last year, we noted that despite the generally poor share price performances, the revenue growth of our portfolio was strong, bordering on very strong at some of our companies, albeit we noted prophetically that we might well be concerned about their ability to replicate this performance over the next couple of years.

Where are we now?

The past six months have seen a slowdown in revenue growth from our technology companies, a resilient performance from our healthcare stocks and continued pressure on the profitability of our consumer businesses.

Large technology companies have in a sense become victims of their own success. Their growth over the past decade means that they are now such a large part of the economies in which they operate that they have become inevitably more cyclical. At the time of the 2008-2009 recession, Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta had combined sales of \$125bn. Today, Apple generates three times that number on its own and the combined sales of these four companies are as near as makes no difference \$1 trillion. As a result, the economic slowdown means that where Microsoft grew sales at 18% last year, we are looking at more like 7% this year. Meta is growing at about 8% where growth was previously well over 20%. Apple and Alphabet will almost certainly have down years in 2023 but we expect a decent bounce back in 2024.

In the healthcare sector, businesses like Stryker continue to benefit from pent-up demand after Covid which drove revenue growth in the company's most recent quarterly results of 13%, several points above its historical run rate. Others like Coloplast or IDEXX remain metronome-like in their reliability and generated revenue growth of 8% and 10% respectively. Novo Nordisk meanwhile was also an extremely reliable business growing at around 10% that has now been transformed into one growing at 25%, courtesy of its weight loss drug Wegovy.

Our consumer companies in the main continue to generate decent top line growth, albeit mostly price led. Estée Lauder was unfortunately the exception with sales down 8% in its most recent report, but we saw outstanding performances from LVMH which grew 17%, PepsiCo which grew 14% and L'Oréal which grew 13%. However rising input costs have put pressure on margins, particularly gross margins or the difference between what it costs a company to make its products and what they can sell them for. Thus Procter & Gamble used to 'make things' for \$0.50 and 'sell them' for \$1.00 but now it costs \$0.53 to make them. McCormick used to make things for \$0.58 and sell them for \$1.00, but now it makes them for \$0.63. Estée Lauder used to make things for \$0.20 and sell them for \$1.00, now it costs \$0.28 to make them. This still leaves our companies' gross margins way above those of the market average which means their bottom lines are better protected but they cannot completely offset these headwinds.

Of our stocks which don't fall into the above three sector categories, Waters 'only' grew sales at 3% where more recently we have benefited from two to three times this level of increase, and this meant that the stock had a poor first half. Sales patterns at this type of business can be lumpy and we expect better in the second half. ADP also had a forgettable first half from a stock price perspective but this was presumably a function of how well the shares did in 2022 since from a business perspective, top line growth of 10% remains bang in line with the historic run rate.

To sum up, conditions are tougher and our companies are mostly having to cope with slower revenue growth and/or higher input costs. However, that's what happens from time to time so we are mostly sanguine about it. We have a few more worries as a result but not a wholesale concern about what is happening.



Investment Manager's review (continued)

Turning from company fundamentals to the macro environment, what level of interest rates will be required to tame inflation? We don't know. Will there be a recession? Of course, but we have no idea when. What will happen in Ukraine? We haven't a clue. Will China take action over Taiwan and how will the United States respond? We have no view. Even if we had we are not sure how markets would react.

Fortunately, it continues to be the case that we do not invest on the basis of our predictions about macroeconomics and geopolitics.

Whilst we await the outcome of these economic and geopolitical conundrums we will seek to continue to do what we set out to do. Which is to assemble a portfolio of high-quality companies and hold onto them so that their inherent ability to compound in value will determine how we perform over the long term.

Yours sincerely,

Teny Smith

Terry Smith

Fundsmith LLP

Disclaimer: A Key Investor Information Document and an English language prospectus for the Fundsmith Equity Fund are available via the Fundsmith website or on request and investors should consult these documents before purchasing shares in the fund. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. The value of investments and the income from them may fall as well as rise and be affected by changes in exchange rates, and you may not get back the amount of your original investment. Fundsmith LLP does not offer investment advice or make any recommendations regarding the suitability of its product. This document is communicated by Fundsmith LLP which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Sources: Fundsmith LLP & Bloomberg unless otherwise stated.

Portfolio turnover compares the total share purchases and sales less total creations and liquidations with the average net asset value of the fund.

MSCI World Index is the exclusive property of MSCI Inc. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein. The MSCI data may not be further redistributed or used as a basis for other indices or any securities or final products. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) was developed by and is the exclusive property of MSCI and Standard & Poor's and 'GICS®' is a service mark of MSCI and Standard & Poor's.

The MSCI World Index is a generic portfolio of global equities across all sectors and, as such, is a fair comparison given the Fund is also global and sector agnostic.

Performance Record

	Share Class T - Accumulation			
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	575.03	665.95	551.66	464.49
Return before operating charges	52.00	(84.92)	120.61	92.43
Operating charges	(3.18)	(6.00)	(6.32)	(5.26)
Return after operating charges	48.82	(90.92)	114.29	87.17
Distributions	(0.52)	(1.02)	(0.77)	(1.78)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	0.52	1.02	0.77	1.78
Closing net asset value per share	623.85	575.03	665.95	551.66
After direct transaction costs of:	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.13
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.49%	(13.65%)	20.72%	18.77%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	4,039,659,552	3,788,714,772	4,654,397,369	3,565,093,281
Closing number of shares	647,533,882	658,868,485	698,914,699	646,250,706
Ongoing charges figure*	1.04%	1.04%	1.04%	1.06%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	639.76	665.58	672.16	559.05
Lowest share price	581.80	523.76	529.56	391.87

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Performance Record (continued)

	Share Class T - Income			
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	524.06	608.00	504.28	426.07
Return before operating charges	47.41	(77.53)	110.19	84.66
Operating charges	(2.90)	(5.48)	(5.77)	(4.82)
Return after operating charges	44.51	(83.01)	104.42	79.84
Distributions	(0.48)	(0.93)	(0.70)	(1.63)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	-	-	-	-
Closing net asset value per share	568.09	524.06	608.00	504.28
After direct transaction costs of:	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.12
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.49%	(13.65%)	20.71%	18.74%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	271,071,127	260,368,137	328,111,991	270,883,618
Closing number of shares	47,716,155	49,682,658	53,965,510	53,716,790
Ongoing charges figure*	1.04%	1.04%	1.04%	1.06%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	583.06	607.66	613.68	511.48
Lowest share price	530.24	478.18	484.08	359.47

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Performance Record (continued)

		Share Class R - A	ccumulation	
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	541.09	629.77	524.30	443.67
Return before operating charges	48.91	(80.30)	114.33	88.02
Operating charges	(4.43)	(8.38)	(8.86)	(7.39)
Return after operating charges	44.48	(88.68)	105.47	80.63
Distributions	-	-	-	(0.13)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	-	-	-	0.13
Closing net asset value per share	585.57	541.09	629.77	524.30
After direct transaction costs of:	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.12
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.22%	(14.08%)	20.12%	18.17%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	536,292,097	507,931,300	563,850,008	434,889,985
Closing number of shares	91,584,623	93,871,572	89,532,639	82,946,393
Ongoing charges figure*	1.54%	1.54%	1.54%	1.56%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	600.98	629.38	635.67	531.40
Lowest share price	547.31	494.16	503.08	373.92

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Performance Record (continued)

	Share Class R - Income			
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	516.22	600.86	500.22	423.43
Return before operating charges	46.62	(76.59)	109.06	83.97
Operating charges	(4.21)	(8.05)	(8.42)	(7.05)
Return after operating charges	42.41	(84.64)	100.64	76.92
Distributions	-	-	-	(0.12)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	-	-	-	-
Closing net asset value per share	558.63	516.22	600.86	500.22
After direct transaction costs of:	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.11
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.22%	(14.09%)	20.12%	18.17%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	12,461,268	12,717,890	30,471,679	22,730,205
Closing number of shares	2,230,682	2,463,675	5,071,350	4,543,999
Ongoing charges figure*	1.54%	1.54%	1.54%	1.56%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	573.34	600.49	606.48	506.99
Lowest share price	522.15	471.46	479.98	356.87

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Performance Record (continued)

	Share Class I - Accumulation			
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	582.05	673.40	557.27	468.75
Return before operating charges	52.64	(85.86)	121.90	90.48
Operating charges	(2.91)	(5.49)	(5.77)	(1.96)
Return after operating charges	49.73	(91.35)	116.13	88.52
Distributions	(0.73)	(1.60)	(1.07)	(2.30)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	0.73	1.60	1.07	2.30
Closing net asset value per share	631.78	582.05	673.40	557.27
After direct transaction costs of:	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.13
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.54%	(13.57%)	20.84%	18.88%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	14,223,417,250	13,360,761,660	16,920,191,240	13,346,652,955
Closing number of shares	2,251,334,611	2,295,475,309	2,512,662,450	2,394,992,157
Ongoing charges figure*	0.94%	0.94%	0.94%	0.96%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	647.78	673.03	679.68	564.72
Lowest share price	588.93	529.86	535.00	395.55

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Performance Record (continued)

	Share Class I - Income			
	6 months to 30.06.23	12 months to 31.12.22	12 months to 31.12.21	12 months to 31.12.20
Change in net asset value per share	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Opening net asset value per share	524.43	608.45	504.38	426.14
Return before operating charges	47.46	(77.60)	110.24	91.10
Operating charges	(2.63)	(4.96)	(5.21)	(10.77)
Return after operating charges	44.83	(82.56)	105.03	80.33
Distributions	(0.66)	(1.46)	(0.96)	(2.09)
Retained distributions on accumulation shares	-	-	-	-
Closing net asset value per share	568.60	524.43	608.45	504.38
After direct transaction costs of:	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.12
Performance				
Return after operating charges	8.55%	(13.57%)	20.82%	18.85%
Other information	£	£	£	£
Closing net asset value	4,523,477,984	4,379,634,649	6,165,167,108	5,608,167,634
Closing number of shares	795,548,364	835,121,053	1,013,262,204	1,111,892,454
Ongoing charges figure*	0.94%	0.94%	0.94%	0.96%
Direct transaction costs	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
Prices	(p)	(p)	(p)	(p)
Highest share price	583.67	608.12	614.13	511.82
Lowest share price	530.65	478.76	484.22	359.61

^{*}The Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is the share class's total annualised operating costs (excluding overdraft interest) expressed as a percentage of the average net assets of the share class.

Further Information

Reports and accounts

Each year, the ACD will publish on its website (www.fundsmith.co.uk) Annual and Interim Reports and Accounts for the Company discussing investment activity during the period and providing management commentary.

UK UCITS

The Company is an authorised Collective Investment Scheme constituted as a UK UCITS in accordance with the FCA rules.

Prospectus

The Fund Prospectus, an important document describing Fundsmith Equity Fund in detail, is available from the ACD, which is responsible for the management and administration of the Fund.

Also available are the Key Investor Information Document (KIID) and the Supplementary Information Document (SID).

The ACD for Fundsmith Equity Fund is Fundsmith LLP located at 33 Cavendish Square, London W1G OPW.

All documents are available on the ACD's website.

Minimum investment

The Company has three different share classes:

I shares, R shares and T shares.

There are two types of share available in each class - Income shares or Accumulation shares.

The following table summarises the investment levels for T shares.

Minimum lump sum investment level£1,000Minimum regular sum investment level£100Minimum top-up investment amount£250Minimum holding level£1,000

Publication of prices

The prices of shares are published daily on the ACD's website at www.fundsmith.co.uk. Shareholders can also obtain the current price of their Shares by calling the ACD on 0330 123 1815.

Dealing Charges

There are no dealing charges on the purchase, sale or switching of shares.

Dilution Adjustment

The ACD may impose a dilution adjustment to the share price. The dilution adjustment aims to mitigate the costs to the Company of making investments (when additional cash is available following new investment into the Company) or selling investments in order to meet redemption requests.

Further information regarding the circumstances in which a dilution adjustment may be applied is set out in the Prospectus.

Contact details

Dealing and enquiries

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Authorised Corporate Director

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Administrator

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Depositary

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